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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify Greenfield grain facility sites within 100 
miles of Holdrege, Nebraska and to evaluate the feasibility of these sites.  CHS Agri 
Service Center currently has facilities that are within 50 miles of Holdrege, Nebraska.  
However there are no Greenfield sites in this area that would be feasible due to a large 
number of competitors already operating in this area. 
This problem was broken down into two components.  The first is site selection and 
the second is a financial model using net present value to determine if the sites selected 
would be profitable to the standards that CHS, Inc. requires (12% or better return on 
assets).  In order to determine where Greenfield sites might be located supply and demand 
factors were evaluated to determine surplus and deficit grain areas.  The areas where there 
were large surpluses of grain have the greatest potential for a Greenfield facility to succeed.  
Then a feasibility analysis of the chosen sites is conducted using net present value and 
internal rate of return analysis to determine if there is enough grain volume to operate the 
grain facility above the 12% return on assets criterion. 
After a detailed review of the supply and demand factors of grain in the region, two 
locations were determined to be good candidates for further study.  Based on recent 
projects completed at CHS, Inc. two model facilities were created as tools to determine if a 
certain facility type is more profitable than another.  The cost structures for these two 
model facilities are based on costs that are currently incurred at CHS Agri Service Center 
locations.  It was found that neither facility at either location was profitable enough to meet 
the minimum performance criteria required by CHS, Inc. 
  
 As a result of these findings it may be possible to move ahead with a Greenfield 
facility at one of these sites if a higher volume can be obtained.  A merger with another 
grain company in the immediate area of the proposed facility may be the best way to 
increase volume.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 CHS Agri Service Center is located in South Central Nebraska.  They are part of 
the Country Operations division of CHS, Inc., a Fortune 100 company.  Currently CHS 
Agri Service Center operates grain facilities in 10 towns in an area roughly 50 miles in 
diameter surrounding Holdrege, Nebraska.  The average grain volume throughput for this 
company over the last three years is 40 million bushels.  The company has seen a volume 
growth trend near 4% per year over the last decade.  This growth has put a lot of strain on 
CHS Agri Service Center’s grain facilities. 
 Since the merger of Agri Coop and CHS, Inc. two years ago, creating CHS Agri 
Service Center, there has been a shift in strategy from survivorship to growth.  In the past 
two years there have been many upgrades to all grain facilities, from new scales and dryers 
to two 700,000 bushel storage bins.  CHS Agri Service Center desires to continue growing 
the company and one way to do this is to add new locations.  Unfortunately, the current 
trade territory of CHS Agri Service Center has many competitors and some areas of this 
territory see heavy price competition.  This limits what can be done in the current trade 
territory.  Other options are to build onto existing facilities or to merge with another grain 
company in the area.  These other options have already been researched with little success.  
CHS Agri Service Center can continue to repair and upgrade their existing facilities, or 
they can look to surrounding areas for opportunities to expand and to do this before a 
competitor takes the initiative.   
 The goal of this research project is to determine if the area surrounding CHS Agri 
Service Center is feasible for any Greenfield facilities.  Greenfield is defined by Wikipedia 
as “undeveloped land that is in a city or rural area.”  The key parameter in determining the 
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size of the expanded territory is that any proposed location be close enough that it could be 
managed and the grains marketed by the current CHS Agri Service Center personnel in 
Holdrege, Nebraska.   
 Recently there has been a large number of new grain facilities constructed, 
especially shuttle loading facilities in the United States.  This is a response to corn and 
soybean yields increasing over time.  Because of this supply increase, there is currently 
more grain than can be handled by the current facilities, many of which are old and require 
upgrades.  This leaves opportunities for companies that have the capital to take advantage 
of them.  CHS, Inc. is one of those companies that are financially able to build new state-
of-the-art locations that can handle the speeds and volumes of today’s harvest.  Another 
option for CHS, Inc. is to update older locations so they can handle the same harvest 
pressures as a new facility.  The purpose of this research is to evaluate the feasibility of 
new Greenfield facilities.  The upgrading of existing facilities is not going to be 
investigated further in this thesis.   
 Accounting for new yield increases may mean that Greenfield facilities may work 
in locations that in the past did not have enough volume to be financially feasible.  If these 
locations can be determined and facilities built, CHS Agri Service Center will increase its 
reach and grain volume.  In the past the only way to expand volume was to merge or enter 
into a joint venture with another company.  In addition, finding and taking advantage of 
these Greenfield site opportunities provides a first mover competitive advantage.  One of 
the reasons expansion into new areas is being looked at before upgrading current facilities 
is that new areas may be lost while upgrade opportunities will still exist in the future.  If the 
current facilities are upgraded first, the opportunity to expand by building a new facility 
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may be taken away by a competitor acting first.  The goal is to find a site and facility type 
that will return a minimum Return on Assets (ROA).  In order for CHS, Inc. to fund any 
investments the project needs to have a minimum return of 12% ROA and the desired 
return is 15% ROA or more.   
 The deliverables of this project are a written thesis, oral defense of this thesis, and a 
presentation to the CHS Agri Service Center General Manager.  In order to answer the 
questions posed above, county data is needed on bushels grown for all of the counties that 
CHS Agri Service Center has facilities in, as well as other counties that fall within 100 
miles of Holdrege, Nebraska.  A three-year average on crop data was used so that crop 
rotations, weather, and other factors which might affect one year will not skew the data.  
Secondly, data on all grain handling facilities, feed yards, and ethanol plants by county is 
needed so that the demand for grains can be assessed.  This information is available in the 
Kansas Grain and Feed Association Directory
1
, the Nebraska Grain and Feed Association 
Directory
2
, and BeefSpotter.
3
  The Grain and Feed Association Directories list all the 
elevators by location with their grain handling capacity, and BeefSpotter is a directory of 
the feed yards and includes data such as their maximum head capacity.  With the supply 
and demand data it is possible to find the surplus and deficit markets.  The next chapter 
describes the previous research and data needed for this thesis.  
                                                 
1 (K. G. Association 2010) 
2
 (N. G. Association 2010) 
3
 (Publications 2010) 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter discusses the underlying factors that ultimately affect the decision for 
CHS Agri Service Center to expand by building new assets or to seek out another way to 
increase grain volume and profitability.  This topic is limited to a specific industry in a 
specific time and place which makes it difficult to find closely related literature.  Porter’s 
five forces of competition which includes barriers to entry, bargaining power of the 
supplier, bargaining power of the buyer, substitutes, and rivalry is used.  The location of the 
CHS Agri Service Center trade territory, Nebraska, is taken into account with the strategic 
and competitive factors that form the basis of the decisions and have the best chance of 
being the right decision and thereby profitable.   
The strategy of the firm is to increase profitability while growing the company by 
adding two new locations in the next three years.  This goal sets the strategy of where the 
company expects to be in three years.  This statement alone does the company little good 
without the domain and means.  The domain is the scope or boundaries that tell 
management what they can and cannot do.  This provides all employees with a solid 
knowledge of what is acceptable and what is not.  This is very important so that resources 
and time are not wasted pursuing ideas and ventures that are outside the focus of the 
company.
4
  
CHS Agri Service Center management has decided that they want to look only at 
proposed sites for expansion within 50 miles of the current trade territory.  As stated earlier, 
the current trade territory is 50 miles in diameter around Holdrege.  This expansion would 
result in opportunities 100 miles in diameter from Holdrege.  Such sites are called 
Greenfield locations since they involve building at new locations.  The reason for not 
                                                 
4 (Argyres 2002) 
5 
 
researching sites beyond 50 miles of the current trade territory is because the management 
and marketing for these new facilities can be done with the current staff at the main office.  
This keeps personnel and office expenses at the same level while increasing grain volumes. 
The means is the how part of the equation.  This is the advantage over the 
competition that makes the new facility profitable.  The advantages over the existing 
competition are 1) having a new modern facility that is designed to handle the speed at 
which grain can be harvested and brought to the elevator and 2) higher margins due to a 
lower cost.  The competitive advantage from speed comes from the producer being able to 
weigh in, dump his load, and then weigh out as fast as possible.  Because a new state-of-
the-art facility can do this faster than any of the competing elevators, producers can haul 
more loads out of their fields per day. 
The benefits to the producer are threefold.  First, the producer finishes harvesting 
quicker and does not have to maintain any extra hired labor to transport the grain, thus 
reducing expenses.  A second benefit is that once the grain is out of the field, there is no 
more risk to the crop from hail, wind, or other perils.  The third benefit is that the producer 
has more free time to pursue other interests in their farming operation.   
The second part of the competitive advantage is higher margins.  A lower cost 
structure coupled with access to CHS, Inc. global markets and reduced transportation costs 
lead to higher margins.  CHS, Inc. is able to buy and sell large quantities of grain all over 
the world, as well as having the largest freight deck of shuttle trains on the BNSF railway.  
The BNSF auctions off shuttle train leases for a one year period.  When a company wins an 
auction, they then have the rights to the train for a year.  CHS, Inc.’s freight deck is the 
compilation of all of the leased trains.  With the largest freight deck on the BNSF of any 
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grain company, being a part of CHS, Inc. makes it easier to get a train into a CHS facility 
on the BNSF railway, and at the time when needed.  Another factor is CHS Inc’s global 
market reach; these factors should allow CHS Agri Service Center to sell the grain for 
higher prices than the competition combined with cost savings from sharing equipment, rail 
freight and personnel, which allows it to pay more for grain in the CHS Argi Service 
Center trade territory. 
 
2.1 Porter’s Five Forces Model 
With this strategy in mind, it is important to identify how competitive forces shape 
this strategy.  Dr. Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School has a framework already 
in place that is commonly referred to as Porter’s Five Forces.5  
 
2.2 Barriers to Entry 
The first force is barriers to entry.  There are several key factors that fall into this 
category that need to be thoroughly examined.  The first of these barriers is the high 
expense of building a new grain elevator.  This can cost as little as $8 million for a smaller 
facility, up to and more than $14 million for a facility with rail access for loading 110 car 
trains.  Because CHS Agri Service Center is a member of CHS, Inc., they have access to 
this amount of capital and can overcome capital constraints that other smaller local grain 
companies cannot.  However, CHS Agri Service Center is the entity that pays these loans 
back and cannot afford to leverage itself too much.  Thus a project of this size can only be 
done every few years unless the returns are quite high, or risk depreciation expense 
increasing to high levels.  While depreciation is not cash, it does show up on the income 
statement and is included in the financial ratios CHS, Inc. uses to evaluate CHS Agri 
                                                 
5 (Porter 2008) 
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Service Center.  In other words, net earnings are used rather than earnings before 
depreciation, taxes, and interest. 
The next barrier to entry is on the supply side, where it is important to have a large 
amount of grain volume to reduce fixed costs per bushel and obtain economies of size.  
This may mean that if CHS Agri Service Center decides to enter a new market, they will do 
so on a large scale, more likely building a facility with rail access and larger grain handling 
capacity, even though it will be more costly in the short run.   
Another barrier to entry is unequal access to distribution channels.  However, in this 
case it is an asset because of the size of CHS, Inc. which operates globally.  In addition, 
CHS, Inc. is the largest owner of rail freight on the BNSF, resulting in better access to 
shuttle trains.  This is important in keeping the grain facilities from filling up with grain at 
harvest, which can result in turning grain away.  Having a large pool of trains to call on is 
especially important at harvest because as the grain comes in and the elevator fills up, this 
pool of trains greatly increases the likeliness of being able to get the train placed before the 
grain elevator goes full.  Once the elevator is full, the farmers are forced to take their grain 
to other grain elevators and that facility has lost out on grain volume.   
One last barrier to entry is competitor retaliation.  It is very important to consider 
possible retaliation by the incumbent competitors as they may react adversely to a new 
entrant in their market.  In this case, it is likely that incumbents will raise their prices for 
grain in the short run, due to increased competition in the area.  However, in the 
intermediate and long run the competing grain companies will try to find new ways to 
increase their facility speed to match that of the new entrant.  At harvest producers are 
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thinking of speed as much as they are thinking about competitive prices.  The competition 
will have to make these upgrades or accept what they can get in this new market. 
 
2.3 Bargaining Power of Suppliers   
A second competitive force is the bargaining power of suppliers.  During most of 
the year the bargaining power goes to the supplier or in this case the producer.  This is 
because the producer has the grain in a protected facility out of the elements so there is less 
of a time constraint to move the grain, and because there is less of a time constraint, the 
producer can haul further away than he/she would at harvest time.  This gives the producer 
access to more markets, allowing the producer to have more bargaining power.  This means 
that price is key and attributes such as speed and service are less important.  For corn, 
soybeans, and sorghum this is January through September, and for wheat this is August 
through June.  At some point, the grain will have to move out of farm storage to make 
room for the new crop but this gives the producer several months to make a decision.  The 
elevator that pays the highest price gets the grain because of this strong price competition.  
Consequently, the producer is not as worried about how long it takes to get through a 
facility as much as how much the facility is paying.  With this in mind, it is important to 
look at the harvest time frame when speed is the determining factor that affects the 
producer’s decision of where to deliver their grain.   
The elevator that can handle grain fastest at harvest will get the majority of the 
grain.  It is also important to understand that a majority of the crop arrives at harvest.  This 
is because there is not enough on-farm storage to hold the entire crop produced and the 
surplus grain has to go somewhere.  Currently, CHS Agri Service Center facilities are 
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receiving approximately 70% of the year’s grain received at harvest.  The ability to fill the 
elevator at harvest and at harvest price levels is key in competing in this trade territory. 
 
2.4 Bargaining Power of Buyers 
The third competitive force is the bargaining power of buyers.  This means that 
CHS Agri Service Center has a competitive advantage over the competition because of the 
ability to market and move grain through the CHS, Inc. network.  If the new facility were a 
shuttle loading facility, this would give the new grain elevator an advantage over the 
competition.  This is due to the ability to move grain by rail and thus this new facility 
would be able to take advantage of CHS, Inc.’s global markets. 
CHS, Inc. sells grains all over the world to destinations including Mexico, Japan, 
China, and other large markets, as well as domestic markets in the United States.  CHS, 
Inc. sells the grain to a variety of entities in these markets, ranging from foreign companies 
to multinationals just like CHS, Inc., and to government trading agencies as well.  Because 
of the large amounts of volumes that are being traded at these levels, the buyers will press 
for reduced pricing.  With the level of competition in the world market, it is a difficult 
market to trade in for a small firm that is not affiliated with a major multinational company 
like CHS, Inc. 
Without being a part of CHS, Inc., the risks of trading into this market are too great.  
CHS Agri Service Center does not have the grain volumes to trade on this level.  With 
grain trades at the international level in the millions of bushels each, CHS Agri Service 
Center would not be able to make many trades, only handling 40 million bushels a year.  In 
addition, if one of these trades went bad it could be financially catastrophic.  Some of the 
risks in these trades are currency fluctuations, oversees logistics, and foreign policy.   
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2.5 Bargaining Power of Substitutes 
A fourth force is substitutes.  There are no product substitutes in this case as CHS 
Agri Service Center is providing a service, but the producers do not have to take their grain 
to an elevator.  There are service substitutes that open up many options for the farmers to 
sell their grain to a feedlot, competing grain company, or an ethanol plant if they choose.  It 
is important to take into account the impacts of these other competitors, especially in the 
non-harvest months, when price is the most important factor. 
Something else to consider is the ease at which a producer can switch between 
delivering grain to a grain company or delivering grain to an ethanol plant, feed yard, or 
another type of end user.  As long as the producer’s grain is not under contract with the 
grain company, they are free to take their grain to whatever entity they choose.   
 
2.6 Rivalry 
The last of the five forces is rivalry among existing competitors.  Initially, there 
may be a flurry of price competition, but after a small amount of time this should decrease.  
The reasons for this are the size of the competing companies, production growth, and 
competition on dimensions other than price.  Because of the size of CHS, Inc. and its lower 
cost structure, the other companies may not be able to compete on price.  If they do, CHS, 
Inc. can match prices and still have the higher return due to its lower cost structure.  
Furthermore, with the average yield of soybeans and corn increasing, thereby increasing 
grain volumes, there should be enough grain produced in the area to reduce some of the 
pressure of rivalry.  Speed is another competitive factor for grain facilities, and with a new 
state-of-the-art facility, other grain elevators in the area may not be able to compete with 
CHS Agri Service Center on speed.  These three factors should be enough to match any 
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long term price competition, as price competition will negatively affect the other 
competitors more than CHS Agri Service Center. 
 
2.7 Retail Agribusiness Competitive Environment 
The competitive environment in retail agriculture has caused a consolidation of 
small grain companies into regional sized grain companies in order to be more competitive.  
The number of cooperatives in Nebraska has fallen in the last 30 years by 75% from around 
200 in 1980 to about 50 today.  During the last 30 years, the average yield of corn has 
grown from 85 bushels per acre in 1980 to 178 bushels per acre in 2009, resulting in a 
yearly average increase of 3.2 bushels.
6
  A key reason for the mergers during this period of 
time was price competition to the point of financial breakeven.  As a result, many grain 
facilities could not afford to add enough storage to keep pace with production increases, 
creating the opportunities for those companies with the capital to take advantage of them. 
  During the last few years, there has been a renewed effort by many grain 
companies to upgrade current facilities, examine Greenfield expansion projects, and add 
more rail access to obtain or increase access to distant markets.  In 2007, Scoular Company 
built a 1.7 million bushel Greenfield site in Holdrege, Nebraska within seven miles of three 
other grain facilities, two of which are in the same town.
7
  The reasons Scoular Company 
did this were that they believed there was enough surplus corn in the area to support their 
new facility, and Scoular Company had negotiated rail rates to Colorado with the Nebraska, 
Kansas, and Colorado Railroad (NKCR), a short line railroad, that provides them a 
competitive advantage in pricing within the region.  Access to the Colorado market was 
                                                 
6 (Nebraska Corn Board n.d.) 
7
 (Scoular Company 2007) 
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important to them as it has traditionally been a deficit corn market and pays a premium for 
corn. 
   ADM is another large grain company that is in an expansion mode in Nebraska.  
They announced on December, 9
th
 2010 that they would be adding two Greenfield sites, 
one in Fullerton and the other in Newman Grove, Nebraska, each with a capacity of 3.5 
million bushels.
8
  These two elevators will be truck only facilities, meaning they will not 
have the capability to load shuttle trains.  The rationale for these facilities is to use them as 
supply depots for their ethanol plant in Columbus, Nebraska.   
Gavilon, another grain company that operates in Nebraska, has announced plans for 
a Greenfield shuttle loading facility in Benkelman, Nebraska on August 23, 2010.  They 
plan on building a facility with 4.8 million bushels of storage capacity.
9
 
This phenomenon is not just in Nebraska; new grain facilities are being constructed 
in other states as well.  Gavilon and Wheat Growers are two grain companies that have 
been active in adding Greenfield shuttle loading facilities.  Gavilon recently announced 
plans to build another new shuttle loading facility in Chester, Montana.  They decided to go 
with 600,000 bushels of concrete storage, with the rest of the storage coming from a large 
ground pile.  This is small for a shuttle loading facility, but the cost structure is very low for 
this type of shuttle loader.
10
  Gavilon also made headlines in October with the buyout of 
DeBruce grain, a large grain company with storage capacity of 140 million bushels.
11
  
Wheat Growers added a shuttle loading facility at Andover, South Dakota that has 3.1 
million bushels of capacity and more than tripled the capacity of a facility at Roscoe, South 
                                                 
8 (ADM Media Relations 2010) 
9 (Gavilon Benkelman 2010) 
10
 (Gavilon Greenfield Site Chester Montana 2010) 
11
 (Gavilon Acqusition of DeBruce 2011) 
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Dakota, as well as adding a one mile long circle track to make the Roscoe facility a shuttle 
loader.  This $40 million project by Wheat Growers is only the first of two phases, as 
Wheat Growers will also be spending another $47 million to upgrade 11 more facilities in 
South Dakota.
12
  These companies are acting now to gain new territories and advantages 
over competitors.   
Another competitor that has been increasing its size and use of corn in these regions 
are the ethanol plants.  In the 100 mile radius around Holdrege, there are 10 ethanol 
facilities, many of which have expanded their facilities in recent years.  These ethanol 
plants can be seen on a map in figure 2.1.  The ethanol plants can be rewarding and 
challenging as a competitor.  On one hand, they need large volumes of corn year round to 
operate.  For a grain company, this provides a good home for corn if a better margin cannot 
be found in another market.  On the other hand, the grain that once went into the grain 
companies may now be going directly to the ethanol plant.  During harvest this is not a big 
problem as most grain companies have all the grain they can handle at this time of the year.  
However, during the rest of the year it only makes the fierce competition that is seen in the 
grain industry even more fierce and cuts deeper into margins.
                                                 
12 (Schmit 2010) 
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Figure 2.1: Map of Ethanol Plants in South Central Nebraska 
17 
 
2.8 Alternative Strategy for a Greenfield Site 
If, at the end of this project it is decided that there are no ideal sites for building a 
Greenfield elevator, there are other options that can be pursued in this market place.  One 
of these is to ally with a competitor through long term contracts, a joint venture, or merger.  
An alliance might allow a scenario to be feasible when without cooperation it would fail.  
These agreements must be mutually beneficial to all entities, most likely reducing the risk 
and capital cost for all involved. 
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CHAPTER III: THEORY 
Because capital is a finite resource, it is important when picking an investment 
project that the project is the best use of capital.  This means that the project needs to have 
a higher return than the cost of capital.  CHS Agri Service Center has several projects that it 
is considering.  Since CHS Agri Service Center has a limited amount of investment capital 
from earnings, they cannot fund every project that is profitable.  Therefore the best project 
needs to be discovered.   
To determine if a project will move forward, Net Present Value (NPV) is used.  Net 
Present Value is the difference between the project’s value and the project’s cost.  NPV is a 
well-known tool because it takes into account the time value of money, which means that a 
dollar today has more value than a dollar tomorrow.  In addition, the opportunity cost of 
capital is taken into consideration.  This is the expected return that is foregone by investing 
in a project rather than a comparable financial security.
13
   
Another financial tool that can be used to determine the feasibility of a project is 
Internal Rate of Return or IRR.  IRR is the rate of discount that makes NPV equal to zero.  
The idea behind IRR is to accept the project if the opportunity cost of capital is less than 
the internal rate of return.  Using NPV in conjunction with IRR shows the level of cost of 
capital at which the projects have a positive NPV.  If this level of cost of capital is above 
the minimum level of cost of capital set forth by CHS, Inc. then the project will move 
forward.  CHS, Inc. has a minimum level of cost of capital set at 12%.  While somewhat 
simplistic, this is a common method incorporated in economic and finance theory for 
valuation of corporate investments.  The next chapter provides information on the data 
methods. 
                                                 
13
 (Allen, 2008) 
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CHAPTER IV: DATA AND METHODS  
The parameters of this project are to find a location or locations to build Greenfield 
grain handling facilities that are profitable enough to earn at least a 12% ROA, and are 
close enough to CHS Agri Service Center’s current trade territory so the new facilities can 
be managed and operated from the current main office in Holdrege, Nebraska.  The 
maximum distance for these sites was decided by drive time.  The projects need to be 
within an hour and a half of Holdrege (roughly 100 miles).  This is so the facility is close 
enough to Holdrege that it can be a part of the group of locations that CHS Agri Service 
Center currently has, and close enough so a new location would not be in a different 
marketing area.  Having locations close together enables the sharing of equipment and 
personnel, which is important in keeping costs down.  A new location built in a market that 
is understood also saves time, reduces the risk of a bad trade, and maximizes margins. 
The first step in data collection was to determine grain supply and the production 
levels for all of the grains grown in the area.  This data shows by county exactly what types 
of grain and quantities of those grains grown.  The next step was to obtain demand numbers 
for this area, specifically how much grain is going to livestock, ethanol, and competing 
grain companies already in these counties.  With the supply and demand numbers known, a 
clear picture county-by-county appears as to where the grain surpluses are as well as the 
location of grain deficits.  After identifying counties that have surplus grain, a more in-
depth study of these counties was undertaken to find the best location for a new facility. 
Table 4.1 shows how the supply and demand data for each county is compiled to 
produce a net grain surplus or deficit in the county.  Viewing all of the counties together 
conveys an idea of grain surpluses and deficits over a regional area.  The first step in the 
20 
 
calculation of supply is to add all of the grains together.  The grain bushels are three-year 
averages.  The next step is to compile all of the demand factors for the county, whether 
feedlots, ethanol, or other grain companies.  The last step is to subtract the demand bushels 
from the supply bushels to obtain the net grain total.  A negative number represents a 
deficit grain total.  The supply data were obtained from the U.S.  Department of Agriculture 
National Agricultural Statistics Service and the demand data were obtained from 
BeefSpotter
14
, ethanol plant websites, Kansas Grain and Feed Association
15
, and Nebraska 
Grain and Feed Association.
16
                                                 
14
 (Publications 2010) 
15
 (K. G. Association 2010) 
16
 (N. G. Association 2010) 
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Table 4.1: Surplus and Deficit County Data for the Kansas Region 
DECATUR COUNTY NORTON COUNTY PHILLIPS COUNTY SMITH COUNTY JEWELL COUNTY 
CORN 5,620,750 CORN 6,145,433 CORN 3,179,733 CORN 2,496,433 CORN 1,489,550 
WHEAT 4,934,000 WHEAT 3,320,500 WHEAT 3,957,500 WHEAT 4,962,000 WHEAT 5,349,000 
SOYBEAN 0 SOYBEAN 313,800 SOYBEAN 390,500 SOYBEAN 1,198,400 SOYBEAN 2,387,967 
SORGHUM 898,950 SORGHUM 1,658,900 SORGHUM 3,842,400 SORGHUM 6,282,933 SORGHUM 5,906,400 
                    
FEEDLOT 3,160,000 FEEDLOT 237,000 FEEDLOT 79,000 FEEDLOT           78,921  FEEDLOT         394,921  
GRAIN CO. 5,574,000 GRAIN CO. 2,657,000 GRAIN CO. 4,644,000 GRAIN CO. 4,545,000 GRAIN CO. 2,118,000 
ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 14,800,000 ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 0 
                    
NET GRAIN 2,719,700 NET GRAIN 8,544,633 NET GRAIN -8,152,867 NET GRAIN 10,315,846 NET GRAIN 12,619,996 
SHERIDAN COUNTY GRAHAM COUNTY ROOKS COUNTY OSBORNE COUNTY MITCHELL COUNTY 
CORN 17,994,000 CORN 2,203,400 CORN 511,733 CORN 1,239,000 CORN 951,133 
WHEAT 4,020,500 WHEAT 2,496,000 WHEAT 3,854,000 WHEAT 4,651,000 WHEAT 8,085,500 
SOYBEAN 484,400 SOYBEAN 130,150 SOYBEAN 544,000 SOYBEAN 740,500 SOYBEAN 1,302,200 
SORGHUM 2,286,700 SORGHUM 4,602,933 SORGHUM 4,695,533 SORGHUM 4,637,400 SORGHUM 5,425,133 
                    
FEEDLOT 4,187,000 FEEDLOT 0 FEEDLOT 711,000 FEEDLOT         237,000  FEEDLOT      1,303,500  
GRAIN CO. 3,706,000 GRAIN CO. 1,944,000 GRAIN CO. 3,835,000 GRAIN CO. 5,554,000 GRAIN CO. 10,627,172 
ETHANOL 17,800,000 ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 0 ETHANOL 0 
                    
NET GRAIN -907,400 NET GRAIN 7,488,483 NET GRAIN 5,059,267 NET GRAIN 5,476,900 NET GRAIN 3,833,295 
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4.1 Calculation of the Supply of Grains 
Yield statistics for the selected counties came from the USDA.  The National 
Agriculture Statistics Service has data by county dating back to 1863.  Because of the 
changes in seed technology, only data for the years 2006 through 2009 were used in the 
calculation to establish if the county is net surplus or deficit grain.  The grain production is 
listed by county and by grain type.  This data was averaged over this time period to remove 
variability due to drought, hail, disease, or crop rotation.  This process was used for each 
county to determine reliable production numbers.  Because the trend yield for the crops 
increases yearly, using the average does not capture the full yield increase over the three 
years and should result in a conservative yield estimate. 
 
4.2 Calculation of the Demand for Grains 
Calculating the use of grains or demand is a more difficult task than estimating the 
supply.  The demand for grain comes from grain companies already in the area, feed yards, 
and ethanol plants.  The grain companies have a limited amount of storage space and that 
capacity number is used in the calculations for grain company demand.  Grain companies 
typically turn over an elevator more than one time per year.  In fact, CHS Agri Service 
Center turned over its facilities 1.65 times in 2009.  The reason elevator capacity was not 
multiplied by 1.65 times in the demand model is that at least some of the grain delivered to 
the elevators is sold to ethanol and feed yards.  If this multiplier were used, the grain 
demanded by ethanol and feed yards would be overstated.  Hence, the data for demand is 
likely to understate demand.  This formula is based on volumes moved out of the area by 
rail and therefore cannot go to local demand sources. 
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The next step in determining demand is to determine the number of feed yards and 
their capacities.  Knowing the cattle and/or hog capacity allows for the calculation of how 
much grain they can consume.  To feed a 600 pound steer to completion takes 60.7 pounds 
of corn.
17
  However, 35% of this corn ration is to be fed as distillers grain reducing the 
actual corn use to 39.5 bushels per head.  It takes approximately 185 days to achieve this 
growth and the feed yard could feed out two steers each year.
18
  This suggests that for 
every head of capacity, there is a potential use of 79 bushels of corn.  This formula is the 
typical ration for growing and finishing cattle in the area.
19
   
In order not to count demand for corn between the ethanol plants and the feed yards 
twice, the amount of distiller’s grain substituted for corn needed to be adjusted for.  Based 
on feedlots in the Holdrege, Nebraska area, it is common for these feedlots to use a 35% 
feed blend of dry distiller’s grain and feeders can use up to 50% dry distiller’s grain in the 
cattle’s diet.20  The 35% level of dry distiller’s grain substitution was used in place of corn 
because it is cheaper and at this level it does not negatively affect the health or weight gain 
of the animal.
21
   
Since a feedlot can turn over its cattle two times in a year, this multiplier was used 
in the calculation of feed yard demand.  Even though prices for grain are high, there has not 
been a decline in cattle numbers in feedlots.  In fact, there was a significant increase in year 
over year cattle on feed numbers.  Cattle and calves on feed for slaughter market in the 
United States for feedlots with capacity of 1,000 or more head totaled 11.6 million head on 
                                                 
17
 (Erickson 2008) 
18
 (Erickson 2008) 
19
 (Erickson, 2008) 
20
 (Feeding Co-Products) 
21
 (Feeding Co-Products) 
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February 1, 2011.  The inventory was 6 percent above February 1, 2010.
22
  Because of this 
increase, it is assumed in the demand calculation for feedlots that the feedlots are running at 
full capacity; therefore the calculations for feedlot demand reflect that as well.  There is 
only one firm that feeds hogs near Holdrege and this corn use must be accounted for in the 
analysis.  Dr. Rob Musser explained that feeder hogs eat a diet of 25-30% dried distiller’s 
grain with 5-10% soybean meal, and 60% corn.  There are other nutritional additives, but 
since they are negligible in the overall percentage weight of the diet, they have been left out 
of the calculation for corn demand.  Dr. Musser is the Director of Sales and Services at 
NutriQuest which focuses on nutritional additives for livestock feed.  Hogs consume about 
5 pounds of total feed rations per day, with corn being 60% of this amount (3 pounds).  
Each hog uses 3 pounds of corn per day, multiplied by 365 days, thus equaling 1095 
pounds per head per year or 19.55 bushels per head.
23
  In the calculation for corn use, the 
hog pens were determined to be at full capacity, therefore the amount of hogs was 
multiplied by 19.55 bushels to calculate the corn use for hogs in the area. 
The last demand factor is ethanol use.  One bushel of corn produces 2.7 gallons of 
ethanol.  To determine the demand for each plant, the maximum ethanol production of each 
ethanol plant was determined and divided by 2.7 to get the amount of bushels needed for 
full capacity.  Even with the historically high prices, ethanol plants are able to operate close 
to breakeven.  Because of this, the demand calculations for ethanol were calculated at full 
capacity.  Table 4.2 shows an example of how the supply and demand factors for each 
county created a surplus or deficit grain position.  
                                                 
22
 (USDA, 2011) 
23
 (Rob Musser, 2011) 
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Table 4.2: Supply and Demand Factors in Buffalo County Nebraska 
SUPPLY 
CROP CORN WHEAT SOYBEANS SORGHUM       
2007 38,774,300 403,800 2,779,400 148,900       
2008 34,101,200 379,200 3,588,200 0       
2009 38,643,700  4,477,800 0       
AVERAGE 37,173,067 391,500 3,615,133 49,633       
                
DEMAND 
  NAME   CITY SIZE BU/HEAD TURN 
OVER/YR 
TOTAL CORN USED 
FEEDLOTS LEWIS FEEDLOT   KEARNEY 12000 39.5 2 948,000 
  MOO FEEDLOT   KEARNEY 3000 39.5 2 237,000 
  PLATTE VALLEY FEEDERS   KEARNEY 13000 39.5 2 1,027,000 
           2,212,000 
                
          RAIL LINE TRACK CAP. FACILITY CAP. 
GRAIN CO. CHS   ELM CREEK  UPRR 100 3,504,000 
  KAAPA   ELM CREEK  UPRR 100 5,500,000 
  CARGILL   GIBBON  UPRR 100 5,803,000 
  B4 GRAIN   KEARNEY    564,000 
  PEAVEY   KEARNEY  UPRR 100 2,270,000 
  CARGILL   RAVENNA  BNSF 54 1,000,000 
  CARGILL   SHELTON  UPRR 100 5,113,000 
           23,754,000 
          CAPACITY BU/GALLON   
ETHANOL ABENGOA BIO   RAVENNA   88,000,000 2.7 32,592,593 
                
            NET COUNTY -17,329,259 
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4.3 Google Earth   
Another tool used to determine the location for a new facility was Google Earth.  
This tool allows for close detailed views of satellite pictures.  This program was effective in 
showing where farmland was, including which land has irrigation pivots on them.  Once a 
county with a large amount of surplus grain was found, this tool was used to pinpoint 
where, within that county the best site for a new facility may be.  Being able to locate the 
facility near large amounts of grain production reduces the distance for producers to haul 
their crop from the field to the elevator.   
 
4.4 Calculation of Shuttle Loading Facilities 
Cost estimates on two mock shuttle loading facilities were examined using cost data 
from recent CHS, Inc. projects and current operations as a guide.  The cost of the track and 
switches (a rail switch is a mechanical device that allows rail cars to be guided from one 
track to another) was removed to get the estimates for truck shipment only facilities.  At 
this point the NPV and ROA were constructed using Microsoft Excel, determining whether 
any potential sites and facilities would be financially feasible given the parameters of the 
overall project. 
Another important aspect to understand is whether or not the grain companies have 
rail access and how many cars they can ship at one time.  This is very important when 
determining the potential competitiveness of a grain company.  Because of the size and 
speed that a full shuttle train (100 or 110 cars) can move grain and the added market reach 
this enables them, it is important when considering a new location.  Even locations that can 
load 27 car units see some benefits in the cost of shuttle movements, as well as being able 
to sell grain to additional markets.  These rail lines can be seen on Figures 4.3 and 4.4, for 
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Nebraska and Kansas respectively.  These rail lines were an important tool in site selection 
as rail access increases the competitiveness of a facility. 
 
4.5 Cost Estimates for Greenfield Facilities 
Cost estimates for two types of structures that are referred to as project A and B 
were calculated.  Estimates were taken from engineering cost information derived from 
constructing new facilities.  Each project included an analysis of rail and truck access.  It 
was apparent that projects A and B would need to have rail access to be feasible. 
Project A includes 120 car rail loop track, 600,000 bushel concrete house, 7000 
bushel per hour dryer, 160,000 bushel steel wet tank, 600,000 bushel steel tank, 1.5 million 
bushel ground pile, office, and scales.  Project B includes 120 car rail loop track, 600,000 
concrete house, 7,000 bushel per hour dryer, 160,000 bushel concrete wet tank, 600,000 
bushel concrete tank, 1.5 million bushel ground pile, office, and scales.  The difference 
between the two projects is that Project A has a 600,000 bushel steel tank, whereas Project 
B has a concrete tank.  The reason for this difference is that concrete is depreciated over 40 
years and steel is depreciated over 20 years.  This difference in depreciation may lead to 
better margins due to a smaller yearly depreciation expense for project B.  Rail access is a 
critical factor for speed and future expected yield increases. 
The next chapter describes the results.
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Figure 4.3: Nebraska Geographical Region Studied. 
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Figure 4.4: Kansas Geographical Region Studied. 
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CHAPTER V: RESULTS  
Three parameters were used to determine the exact site of a new facility.  First, the 
facility should be placed in an area that has a large amount of surplus grain.  Figure 5.1 is a 
list of all counties that were researched for this thesis with data on crop production, uses of 
the grain, and a net value for each county.  Second, the facility should be near rail lines so 
loading a shuttle train would be possible.  A shuttle train is a 100 or a 110 unit car train, 
and because of this size the railroad can move a large quantity of goods efficiently, 
allowing the railroads to pass on these cost savings to the shipper.  Another benefit to 
loading shuttle trains is access to more markets.  Typically, these distant markets pay more 
for grain than local markets because they have deficit amounts of grain, whereas the local 
region is surplus grain.  
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Table 5.1: Net Production by County 
County Production Ethanol Use Feedlot Use Grain 
Companies 
Net Production 
Thomas 0 0 0 0 0 
Blaine 242,000 0 0 0 242,000 
Loup 1,270,100 0 0 0 1,270,100 
Garfield 1,813,667 0 790,000 0 1,023,667 
Logan 3,657,567 0 0 0 3,657,567 
Custer 43,733,316 0 8,532,000 4,809,831 30,391,485 
Valley 13,872,500 18,500,000 553,000 5,042,000 -10,222,500 
Sherman 15,013,367 0 0 1,236,000 13,777,367 
Lincoln 37,186,167 10,400,000 9,440,500 6,890,000 10,455,667 
Dawson 40,952,717 14,814,815 12,213,400 11,622,000 2,302,502 
Buffalo 41,229,333 32,592,593 2,212,000 23,754,000 -17,329,260 
Frontier 15,844,500 0 0 6,631,000 9,213,500 
Gosper 16,792,201 0 0 827,000 15,965,201 
Phelps 41,213,234 0 8,508,300 20,036,652 12,668,282 
Kearney 36,066,867 20,370,000 2,607,000 16,268,000 -3,178,133 
Adams 38,167,301 42,260,000 3,950,000 35,712,000 -43,754,699 
Red 
Willow 
17,000,834 0 2,054,000 10,586,671 4,360,163 
Furnas 19,494,333 16,300,000 0 10,436,000 -7,241,667 
Harlan 19,555,650 0 790,000 6,476,000 12,289,650 
Franklin 18,228,666 0 0 5,337,000 12,891,666 
Webster  15,844,367 0 3,792,000 6,974,000 5,078,367 
Decatur 11,453,700 0 3,160,000 5,574,000 2,719,700 
Norton 11,438,633 0 237,000 2,657,000 8,544,633 
Phillips 11,370,133 14,800,000 79,000 4,644,000 -8,152,867 
Smith 14,939,766 0 78,921 4,545,000 10,315,845 
Jewell 15,132,917 0 394,921 2,118,000 12,619,996 
Sheridan 24,785,600 17,800,000 4,187,000 3,706,000 -907,400 
Graham 9,432,483 0 0 1,944,000 7,488,483 
Rooks 9,605,266 0 711,000 3,835,000 5,059,266 
Osborne 11,267,900 0 237,000 5,554,000 5,476,900 
Mitchell 15,763,966 0 1,303,500 10,627,172 3,833,294 
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The third parameter for site selection is to study satellite imagery to determine where 
cropland is located in the counties.  This tool allows for detailed views of farms to determine where 
farmland is, including which land has irrigation pivots on it.  Once a county with a large amount of 
surplus grain was found then this tool was used to pinpoint exactly within that county where the 
best site for a new facility would be.  The advantage of this tool is being able to locate a facility 
near large amounts of high yield land, reducing the distance for a majority of the producers to get 
their crop from the field to the elevator, in turn reducing the transportation cost for the producer 
and increases the likelihood that the grain will go to that facility, maximizing grain volume.   
With all of the county data researched, it was apparent that there were only two counties 
that that were good candidates to have enough surplus grain to support a Greenfield facility.  These 
counties had the most surplus grain either within the county or surrounding the county that would 
be needed to reach the volumes necessary for a profitable grain facility.  The two cities that were 
picked to be the best locations based on grain surplus, nearby farm land, and access to rail and 
highway, were Merna, Nebraska and Esbon, Kansas.  These locations satisfy the conditions stated 
earlier in that both are located 100 miles or less from Holdrege, have rail access, and are in a 
surplus region for grain.   
The reason that Esbon was picked as a Greenfield site was that Jewell County has the 
highest amount of surplus grain of all the Kansas counties researched, with 12,619,996 bushels.  
Esbon is also near the county line, only a few miles from Smith County, which has the second 
largest amount of surplus grain in the Kansas counties researched, with 10,315,846 bushels, and 
Esbon is located on the KYLE short line railroad.  The reasons that Merna was chosen is that it is 
in a county with the most grain surplus of all 31 counties researched, is located on the BNSF 
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mainline, and is centered in the heart of the best farmland in the county.  Aerial views of these two 
sites can be seen in figure 5.1 and 5.2. 
Once the sites for the potential new facilities were selected, crop yield data was studied, 
specifically to predict how much the yield of corn, soybeans, wheat, and sorghum may change over 
the life of the project.  Twenty years were assumed for the life of the project because that is the 
amount of time it would require to repay the loan, and project types with steel bins would be fully 
depreciated in 20 years.  The process of predicting future yield statistics started with obtaining 
yield data history.  The yield data indicate a linear trend across all grains over a 70-year time 
frame, with the one exception being in Jewell County.  For Jewell County, the corn production data 
only went back as far as 1958 but the trend line from 1958 to 2009 was linear as well.  Corn yield 
data for the CHS Agri Service Center has been increasing at an average rate of 2.56% per year.  
However, corn bushels delivered has been increasing at a rate of 4% per year.  Some of this 
discrepancy may stem from a lack of new on-farm storage, which means that a greater percentage 
of the producer’s crop has to be brought in at harvest, leaving the same amount of bushels on farm 
to deliver later.  CHS Agri Service Center has a better chance of getting the grain at harvest rather 
than after, because of the increased competition for the grain after harvest.   
With trend yield for corn increasing yearly this would suggest that 1 million bushels of 
production today should increase to 1.57 million bushels produced 20 years from now.  The 
reasons for these yield increases are improved hybrids, fertilizers, equipment, and soil 
improvement techniques.  Since the life of the project is 20 years and the production of grains at 
the beginning of the project compared to the end of the project are going to be very different, it is 
important to consider these increased production levels.  To do this, the production numbers were 
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increased over a 20-year period using the trend increases for the area being studied and for each 
grain type.   
Figure 5.1: Google Earth Map of Custer County 
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Figure 5.2: Google Earth Map of Jewell County 
 
 
  Figure 5.3 illustrates the estimated trend yield increase for corn at Merna, and Figure 5.4 
illustrates the trend yield for all grain at Esbon, based on trend data from 1940 and projecting out to 
2030.  The historical yield data for corn at Merna has a high level of correlation to the trend line, 
showing little volatility year to year.  In fact, on average there is only a 2.86% variance between 
the trend yield and the actual yield between 1940 and 2010.  The historical yield data for corn at 
Esbon are not positively correlated and show that there is a lot more volatility.  The average 
variance from the trend yield at Esbon is 30.54% and this translates into a greater amount of risk 
when predicting grain volumes.  For this project, that means that there may be more error involved 
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in the calculation of trend yields at Esbon.  This is why a data period of 70 years was used, in 
hopes of reducing this error by using a larger sample. 
It is very important to take into consideration the increasing grain yield over the life of the 
project.  In the cases of the Merna and Esbon locations, the trend yield increases correspond to an 
estimated increased grain volume around 5 million bushels by the year 2030 for each location.  The 
projects are mutually exclusive based on the boundaries of this research project.   
 
Figure 5.3: Corn Yield for Custer County Nebraska 
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Figure 5.4: Crop Yields for Jewell County Kansas 
 
 
Table 5.2 shows the NPV calculation for each site.  Neither Merna, nor Esbon would 
handle enough grain to be profitable at a 12% or better ROA.  It did not matter what type of facility 
was built, whether it was steel or concrete.  It did not make enough difference to reach the 12% 
ROA hurdle.  Being able to load rail was better in both project types and this shows just how 
important having access to the rail markets is in being profitable.  However, rail access did not 
make enough difference to justify building a new grain facility.  Since neither project types could 
return 12% ROA, only the project type with the highest rate of return is reviewed here.  The project 
that came out ahead was Project B because it is the lowest cost facility to build (it is all concrete 
and can be depreciated over a longer period of time than a steel facility). 
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Table 5.2: NPV Calculation for Project B at Esbon and Project B at Merna 
 Rail Cost Interest 
Rate 
Year on Loan Dryer/Wet Bin 
Addition 
Opportunity Cost of 
Capital 
  
 $2,408,472  5.00% 20 $2,300,000  7.5530% IRR   
Esbon Project B    Year   Bushels 
Produced 
Income Expenses Net Income 
Project Cost $14,433,138  C0 ($14,433,138)         
    2011 $907,271  7,639,063  $3,047,986 2,140,715  907,271  
Margin Cents/Bushel $0.29  2012 $970,102  7,830,039  $3,124,186 2,154,084  970,102  
Storage cents/bushel $0.07  2013 $1,034,504  8,025,790  $3,202,290 2,167,786  1,034,504  
Drying cents/bushel $0.04  2014 $1,100,516  8,226,435  $3,282,347 2,181,831  1,100,516  
Total Cents/Bushel $0.40  2015 $1,168,179  8,432,096  $3,364,406 2,196,227  1,168,179  
# of Trains Loaded 22 2016 $1,237,533  8,642,898  $3,448,516 2,210,984  1,237,533  
    2017 $1,308,621  8,858,971  $3,534,729 2,226,109  1,308,621  
    2018 $1,381,486  9,080,445  $3,623,097 2,241,612  1,381,486  
    2019 $1,456,172  9,307,456  $3,713,675 2,257,503  1,456,172  
Annual Facility Cost $1,158,152 2020 $1,532,726  9,540,142  $3,806,517 2,273,791  1,532,726  
Labor Cost Per Bushel 0.04 2021 $1,611,194  9,778,646  $3,901,680 2,290,486  1,611,194  
Maintenance/MISC 75,000.00 2022 $1,691,623  10,023,112  $3,999,222 2,307,599  1,691,623  
Utilities Per Bushel 0.03 2023 $1,774,063  10,273,690  $4,099,202 2,325,139  1,774,063  
Total Cents Per Bushel 0.070 2024 $1,858,564  10,530,532  $4,201,682 2,343,118  1,858,564  
Annual Truck Expense $12,000  2025 $1,945,178  10,793,795  $4,306,724 2,361,546  1,945,178  
Annual Depreciation $360,828 2026 $2,033,957  11,063,640  $4,414,392 2,380,436  2,033,957  
    2027 $2,124,955  11,340,231  $4,524,752 2,399,797  2,124,955  
    2028 $2,218,229  11,623,737  $4,637,871 2,419,642  2,218,229  
    2029 $2,313,834  11,914,330  $4,753,818 2,439,984  2,313,834  
    2030 $2,411,829  12,212,189  $4,872,663 2,460,834  2,411,829  
    NPV $57          
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 Rail Cost Interest 
Rate 
Year on 
Loan 
Dryer/Wet Bin Add 
On 
Opportunity 
Cost of Capital 
  
 $2,408,472 5.0% 20 $2,300,000 2.954% IRR   
Merna Project B   Year   Bushels Produced Income Expenses Net Income 
Project Cost $14,433,138 C0 ($14,433,138)         
    2011 $922,936  7,634,591 $3,063,338 2,140,402  922,936  
Margin Cents/Bushel $0.212 2012 $969,880  7,820,875 $3,123,322 2,153,442  969,880  
Storage cents/bushel $0.070 2013 $1,017,969  8,011,704 $3,184,769 2,166,800  1,017,969  
Drying cents/bushel $0.040 2014 $1,067,231  8,207,190 $3,247,715 2,180,484  1,067,231  
Total Cents/Bushel $0.322 2015 $1,117,695  8,407,445 $3,312,197 2,194,502  1,117,695  
# of Trains Loaded 22 2016 $564,391  8,612,587 $2,773,253 2,208,862  564,391  
$27500/Train Rebate (5Yr) $605,000 2017 $617,348  8,822,734 $2,840,920 2,223,572  617,348  
    2018 $671,597  9,038,009 $2,910,239 2,238,641  671,597  
    2019 $727,170  9,258,536 $2,981,249 2,254,078  727,170  
Annual Facility Cost $1,158,152 2020 $784,099  9,484,444 $3,053,991 2,269,892  784,099  
Labor Cost Per Bushel 0.040 2021 $842,417  9,715,865 $3,128,509 2,286,091  842,417  
Annual 
Maintenance/MISC 
75,000.000 2022 $902,158  9,952,932 $3,204,844 2,302,686  902,158  
Utilities Per Bushel 0.030 2023 $963,357  10,195,784 $3,283,042 2,319,686  963,357  
Total Cents Per Bushel 0.070 2024 $1,026,049  10,444,561 $3,363,149 2,337,100  1,026,049  
Annual Truck Expense $12,000 2025 $1,090,270  10,699,408 $3,445,209 2,354,939  1,090,270  
Annual Depreciation $360,828 2026 $1,156,059  10,960,474 $3,529,272 2,373,214  1,156,059  
    2027 $1,223,452  11,227,909 $3,615,387 2,391,934  1,223,452  
    2028 $1,292,490  11,501,870 $3,703,602 2,411,112  1,292,490  
    2029 $1,363,213  11,782,516 $3,793,970 2,430,757  1,363,213  
    2030 $1,435,661  12,070,009 $3,886,543 2,450,881  1,435,661  
    NPV $24          
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Using the NPV function for the Esbon project vs. a 12% opportunity cost shows 
that Project B (assuming a 20 year facility life) has a net present value of -$4,467,601, 
meaning that this project should not be built.  Building the project without rail would result 
in a net present value of -$10,882,280, suggesting that this would not be the best way to 
spend the capital either.  If this is considered in terms of IRR, Project B at Merna is only 
feasible with a cost of capital rate of 2.954% and the same facility at Esbon would have a 
cost of capital rate of 7.553%.  While Project B at both locations would be profitable, there 
are better ways to use this investment capital that will generate better returns.  To bring 
these returns into perspective, the average return of the S&P 500 over the last 60 years is 
6.8%.  Only Project B at Esbon would have a return over 6.8%.   
The two factors that the projects are going to be sensitive on are grain volume and 
opportunity cost.  Grain volume has a large impact on the outcome of the NPV model since 
every bushel has a margin, more bushels will mean more income and a higher ROA.  The 
grain handle factor is difficult to predict since it has multiple variables in its calculation, 
and each calculation with its own room for error.  One such place where an error could 
occur is the estimated area of draw.  This is the area around the proposed Esbon and Merna 
facilities.  This surrounding area that the draw of grain is figured from is based on current 
trends that CHS Agri Service Center typically has at its locations.  However, just because 
this area of draw is predictable with current CHS Agri Service Center locations, does not 
mean that a new region would have the same draw.   
Another variable in the grain handle factor is the increase of yield where Esbon has 
a 1.56% per year (an average increase of four types of grains grown in the area).  This is 
based on county yield data for the last 70 years.  Since the area around Esbon produces four 
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grain types, the changing of ratios between the crops grown year to year will increase the 
likeliness of an error in this calculation.  For example, corn yields are 131 bushels per acre 
and soybean yields are 42 bushels per acre.  If there were a large acreage shift from one of 
the crops to the other, this would have a large impact on the production numbers for the 
county.  With the grain handle in the Merna area, the margin of error should be smaller 
than with the Esbon project.  This is because at Merna there are only two crops grown, corn 
and soybeans, and corn is 87.7% of crop production.  This should lead to more reliable data 
when calculating the yearly increase in grain yields and the net grain production for the 
county. 
The opportunity cost is another factor that is very sensitive in this model.  In all of 
the grain facility project types, the opportunity cost of capital has been set at 12%.  This is 
because anything under 12%, CHS, Inc. will decide not to fund.  If it is decided that the 
opportunity cost should be lowered, then one of these projects may be feasible at that lower 
level of opportunity cost.   
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The goal of this project is to find the best way to increase grain volume and 
profitability at CHS Agri Service Center.  There are two main ways to do this.  One is to 
upgrade old facilities by increasing capacity and/or speed at which grain can be moved.  
The other way is to build a new facility.  This project research only focuses on the 
feasibility of Greenfield expansion.  Because of all the new facilities being built across the 
United States, there is a concern that if Greenfield expansion was not looked into right 
away, then a competitor may build a site and move into or near to the CHS Agri Service 
Center territory.  For that reason, upgrades and expansions will come second to any 
Greenfield site that meets the financial criteria for building a new grain facility.   
CHS, Inc. has established that in order for a capital project to move forward there 
must be a return of at least 12% ROA.  This means that in order to build a new grain 
facility, there must be sufficient evidence to show that the project will return a minimum of 
12% ROA.  In order to present this evidence, research into an area of 100 miles radius 
around Holdrege, Nebraska was conducted.  The reason this distance was chosen was so 
that the same management and marketing personnel could be utilized, saving costs.  The 
research that was conducted in this region had two goals; the first to find out the supply of 
grain in each county in the research area, and the second to find out what the demand is for 
the grain in the same area.  The supply data was found by county on the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service website.  The demand data, which is the amount of grain 
used by ethanol plants, feedlots, and grain companies, was found using information from 
the ethanol plant’s websites, the BeefSpotter24 publication, which provided capacity 
                                                 
24
 (Publications 2010) 
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information for the feedlots, Kansas Grain and Feed Association,
25
 and Nebraska Grain and 
Feed Association,
26
 which provided capacity data on the grain facilities.   
Two locations were identified as possible Greenfield sites, one at Esbon, Kansas 
and the other at Merna, Nebraska.  Based on research data and costs from two facility 
models neither location is feasible.  This conclusion became clear through the use of an 
NPV and IRR model which found that neither site would meet the minimum threshold for 
investment.  Esbon had an IRR of 7.553% and Merna had an IRR of 2.954%.  These IRR 
numbers need to be above 12% to meet the minimum return required. 
 
6.1 Limitations of this Research 
One limitation of this project is the scope of counties used.  It is helpful when 
determining a Greenfield site to know the grain flows in the region.  Grain will flow from a 
surplus county to a nearby deficit county.  It would have been beneficial in this thesis 
research to have researched one or even two counties beyond the scope of the project, in 
order to understand the flow of grain in the counties in the scope of the project.  Because of 
this oversight the surplus or deficit nature of the outlying counties researched are not fully 
understood.  Potential Greenfield sites on the border counties of the research area could 
have been missed entirely or even misinterpreted as having surplus grain when that grain 
flows out of the county.   
Another problem that would need to be addressed before proceeding any further 
with the Esbon location is rail service.  The short line railroad KYLE has not been 
contacted to determine if they can provide shuttle loader service at this location.  Two 
                                                 
25
 (K. G. Association 2010) 
26
 (N. G. Association 2010) 
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important questions are: Can their track handle heavy cars?  Do they have the power and 
personnel to spot trains in the window that they will be required by the UP or BNSF 
railroads?  The Kyle railroad has access to both Class I railroads, and it would be important 
to know if the new facility would have access to one, both, or any of the class one railroads.   
Another oversight in this thesis was the facility models that were used to get cost 
estimates.  The facility models that were used were too similar to each other and were 
constructed based on what a grain company would want in a facility and no models were 
constructed to show a minimalistic approach.  Just for the sake of determining if a minimal 
cost structure would be financially feasible at either location a rough estimate of $10 
million was used for the cost estimate.  Using this cost estimate the IRR for Esbon is 
11.954% and the IRR for Merna is 7.000%.  A facility with a $10 million cost would fall 
just short of the 12% ROA minimum required for Esbon and 5% short at Merna.  In future 
research this model needs to be estimated to reflect all possibilities for Greenfield sites. 
 
6.2 Suggestions for future Research 
There needs to be more research done at the Esbon location to determine if a cost 
estimate for a facility can be put together and come in under $10 million.  Based on the 
simplistic math calculation, a project would have to come in just under $10 million to get 
the ROA above 12%.  The other issue at Esbon is the railway problem.  The KYLE railroad 
needs to be contacted and details on track conditions and service need to be addressed 
confidentially. 
Based on current data the returns on even a bare minimum facility at Merna do not 
come close to the minimum 12% ROA required and no amount of changing of facility 
types is able to close that gap.  The next step at Merna would be to determine if a strategic 
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alliance of some sort would be feasible at this location.  The best case scenario would be a 
merger with the Farmers Coop in Merna.  In this case Farmers Coop already has a 54 car 
loading facility.  Investments would need to be made in the amount of rail siding, the 
capacity of the elevator, and the speed of the load out facility.  There are many benefits to 
this, which include a reduced cost in building up the current facility rather than building a 
Greenfield site, less competition because of the merger, and the customer base is already 
established.  Using an upgrade cost of $7 million and the original amount of bushels from 
the research data this merger would have a ROA of 11.848%.  More research needs to be 
done to determine what the actual costs of upgrading this facility would be and whether or 
not to include the grain bushels from the Farmers Coop facility on top of the estimated 
bushels that a Greenfield site would receive. 
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